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Abstract 
This paper examines the possibility of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) implementation in the 
United States. Theory and past experiments suggest a reduction in work hours, but both say little 
regarding the capital to labor ratio. Existing literature on the topic is also underwhelming, 
therefore this paper will go on to examine their relationship. It also reviews healthcare’s role in 
this relationship as it is related to worker productivity as well as nearly one fifth of GDP for the 
US. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The US economy has benefited greatly from technological advancements over the 200 
years beginning with the American Industrial Revolution. Different markets across the US have 
benefitted in everything from greater efficiency through massive economies of scale to the 
lowering of transactions costs to companies through computer technology. However, in the past 
50 years the US economy has begun to feel the negative effects of technology as the machines 
created begin to replace the US workforce. As anyone who has worked to support their lives 
knows, their largest and most valuable asset to them is their working income, which has been 
increasingly at risk due to automation. According to Forbes in 2018: “Technology Has Already 
Taken Over 90% Of The Jobs Humans Used To Do” (Forbes, 1). A prime example of this is the 
rapid advancement in equipment for farming over the past 100 years. The US has changed from 
a place that was majority farmers to one where a small minority is easily able to produce food for 
the rest of the country. In the US, only 0.6% of employment is in agriculture (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics). As it is apparent, technology has already taken millions of jobs away from the 
American workforce and can continue to do so in the future. Figure 1 shows the different 
occupations by volume in the US. In most of them, some jobs have already been taken by 
automation and computer technology.  
While US consumers and producers alike have enjoyed the lower costs that come with 
these technological advances, the labor force continues to worry about this advanced capital 
replacing them. This problem is presented in the form of the capital to labor ratio. Figure 2 
shows the capital to labor ratio in the US over time since 1948. It is obvious that, with some 
variation, capital has steadily become a larger proportion of input in US production. One 
potential answer to this problem is presented in the form of Universal Basic Income (UBI). The 
goal of this paper is to further examine UBI and other cash transfer programs and analyze 
whether they help address the modern issue of technology replacing the workforce. Furthermore, 
this paper will analyze how health and healthcare plays a role in this relationship between UBI 
and the capital to labor ratio.  
Currently, there is no existing empirical literature that directly answers this research 
question. There does exist, however, literature that helps set the stage for this complex research 
question. There is literature that illustrates the effect of health and healthcare on worker 
productivity, the effect of increased income on health in low income households, and the effect 
of cash transfer programs on work hours and labor input. There is also basic economic theory 
that describes how the above relationships should behave, as well as the effects between worker 
productivity and the capital to labor ratio. It is important to note that most literature on 
unconditional cash transfer programs centered on the US are from the 1970’s after four US based 
Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments and one in Canada.   
The contributions of this work are to open the door for more research and focus on the 
use of UBI and other unconditional cash transfer programs to address the issue of US workers 
being replaced by capital. This is a highly debated topic in the US due to its political sphere 
being highly charged by the loss of jobs across the country. On top of that, UBI has made an 
appearance in the US political stage for the first time since the 70’s when the NIT experiments 
were conducted. This paper hopes to encourage more study within and outside of the US of this 
relationship, especially within the scope of capital being altered or not due to UBI or an 
equivalent being implemented.  
To analyze the research question stated above, this paper runs a least-squares regression 
with capital to labor ratio as the dependent variable. The result is that UBI has a negative 
coefficient significant at the 0.1 level. Worker health was measured using average sick days 
taken, which will be explained later, and was also found to have a negative coefficient significant 
at the 0.01 level. This means that UBI does in fact negatively impact the capital to labor ratio as 
the research question hypothesizes. However, worker health measured by sick days taken has a 
negative coefficient which signifies that healthier workers lead to an increase in the capital to 
labor ratio, contrary to the hypothesis.   
The rest of this paper goes into a deeper analysis of the above summary. The second 
section describes the theory and literature review necessary to address the topic. This section will 
be important to understand why data is chosen in the way it is later in the paper. The third section 
describes the methodology on obtaining the data for the regression and how it was run. The 
fourth section is a review and analysis of the results from the third section. This section also 
includes possible shortcomings in collecting data for the regression and possible problems in the 
regression itself. The fifth section is a conclusion of the topic including possible avenues for 
future study as well as policy recommendations based on the findings. The sixth section will 
contain all figures and tables. The seventh section will have all references used in the creation of 
this paper.  
 
II. THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
UBI in the United States has evoked strong feelings both supporting and opposing the 
idea. Although the idea of UBI or similar welfare programs has existed for centuries before, the 
large amount of the discussion in the US didn’t begin until the early to mid-1970’s when five 
experiments were conducted in North America. Four of these experiments were based in the US 
and were all Negative Income Tax (NIT) experiments. NIT is slightly different from UBI but 
close enough to be comparable as will be discussed later. The first of the experiments was the 
New Jersey Graduated Work Incentive Experiment, which took place from 1968-1972 and was 
conducted in New Jersey and Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania. The second was the Rural Income 
Maintenance Experiment (RIME), which took place from 1970-1972 and was conducted in rural 
parts of Iowa and North Carolina as a supplement to the New Jersey experiment. The third was 
the Seattle/Denver Income Maintenance Experiment (SIME/DIME), which took place from 
1970-1980 with the expectation that it would last until 1990. This means that the subjects 
believed it would be extended another 10 years when it was cut short. The fourth experiment was 
the Gary Income Maintenance Experiment, which took place from 1971-1974 and conducted in 
Gary, Indiana. The fifth experiment, the one in Canada, was the Manitoba Basic Annual Income 
Experiment, often abbreviated to Mincome. This experiment took place from 1975-1978 when 
the experiment was cancelled by the Canadian government. Table 1 below highlights further 
details on the experiments and their differences. 
 The experiments had common themes in their results that varied slightly depending on 
the focus of the researcher presenting them. What did not appear was any significant difference 
in the outcomes between the Mincome experiment and the other four NIT experiments, 
therefore, as I move forward, they will be referenced as all five experiments instead of four and 
one. What did appear, as was expected, were reduced work hours in the treatment groups of 
these experiments when compared with their respective control groups. That reduction varied 
depending on the head of the household and the type of family that was being observed, but 
overall there were consistent reductions. In fact, US media mostly focused on the change in work 
hours with articles titles such as “Would payments to those who earned less than a certain 
amount reduce their incentive to work?” (Scientific American, 1). This article was published in 
October of 1972, just as interest in the field began to rise. From that moment up through 1980, 
242 academic articles were published addressing the new topic, most of which had the same 
question: How much less will people work? Most of these articles failed to state, however, that 
even though work hours were reduced, this did not necessarily translate to a reduction in labor 
supply as will be explained below.  
Articulating basic economic labor theory is crucial to understanding why reduced work 
hours were highlighted in the US and continue to be highlighted around the world with similar 
unconditional cash transfer programs such as NIT and UBI. Focusing down to a microeconomic 
level, it is apparent that there exists a basic utility function for any given individual that 
demonstrates the balance between gaining satisfaction from consuming goods vs. leisure. 𝑈 =
𝑓(𝐶, 𝐿). The model then progresses by including a budget constraint on the utility function. 𝐶 =
𝑤ℎ + 𝑉. In this equation, 𝐶 represents the dollar value of expenditures on goods, 𝑤 represents 
the hourly wage rate, ℎ represents the the number of hours the individual will spend in the labor 
market, 𝑤ℎ therefore represents the individual’s labor earnings, and 𝑉 represents nonlabor 
income. In our model, we are comparing the time spent by the individual as time spent towards 
work or leisure, so we can say that their total amount of time is equal to the amount they spend 
doing either activity, 𝑇 = ℎ + 𝐿. Then we can arrange our previous equation in terms of total 
time and leisure such that, 𝐶 = 𝑤(𝑇 − 𝐿) + 𝑉 = (𝑤𝑇 + 𝑉) − 𝑤𝐿, which will be our budget 
constraint.  
For the purpose of this paper, the main focus of the equation will be the change of 𝑉, 
which would be representative of an increase or implementation of UBI or some similar welfare 
program. From the equations it is obvious that an increase in 𝑉 results in an upward shift in the 
budget constraint, which allows the utility curve to move further out. Depending on the 
individual and their utility function, theory suggests that hours of leisure could either increase or 
decrease hours of leisure. However, empirical data, including from the five NIT experiments, 
suggests that it is usually an increase in hours of leisure, in other words, a reduction in work 
hours. This basic idea is exactly why work hours were headlined in the US for during the 
experiment’s run times. However, the basic theory that non-economists latched onto such as 
above, makes several assumptions about an individual and says nothing as to how they would 
take time off work.  
Misinformation stemming from the desire for a bottom-line conclusion from the 
experiments in the US led people to often say that people were working less. However deeper 
analysis revealed that reduced hours worked often appeared in the form of occasional hours 
taken off during the week or longer periods of time taken in unemployment while workers took a 
longer time searching for new jobs. Even more dangerous, the above misinformed statements 
also led the general US public to believe that NIT would reduce the labor supply, which is 
understood as a worst-case result from the experiments. However, deeper analysis yet again 
shows that these believes were not consistently supported. Instead, some studies that mentioned 
labor supply in their analysis found little to no change in labor supply of the treatment groups in 
comparison to their respective control groups, or that these changes were often insignificant. The 
New Jersey Experiment Summary Report explains this the best at the end of their Labor Supply 
Response Section. “The patterns of labor supply response found in the experiment are not as 
clear as might have been expected. Yet in many ways they are clearer and more sensible than the 
results of much of the nonexperimental literature. Certainly they call into serious question the 
very large effects estimated in some of the nonexperimental studies. On the basis of the 
experimental results, it does not appear that income-conditioned cash transfers for intact families 
at the levels of basic benefits and implicit tax rates employed in the experiment would have very 
large effects on labor supply” (New Jersey). If the aggregate were to behave as the individual 
does in the consumption and leisure model we created, then it can be reasonable to state that 
hours worked across the US will be reduced as a result. However, this would suggest that there is 
no evidence stemming from the experiments to support that labor supply would be reduced 
across the country. In one paper by Hum and Simpson (1993), their estimates show that 
elasticities for substitution and income in reference to structural labor-supply response are quite 
low, hovering around .08 and -.10 respectively. These results show that the elasticities are 
extremely inelastic in both directions. If that is the case, then an increase in nonlabor income 
such as NIT or UBI would have a minimal effect on the labor supply. Hum and Simpson even go 
on to note that many competing regression results of the elasticities will switch signs, and many 
end up being insignificant results, which means that elasticity can often be ignored and thought 
of as zero.  
Other academic articles supported public opinion with their analysis of labor supply from 
the NIT experiments. For example, “A Comparison of the Labor Supply Findings from the Four 
Negative Income Tax Experiments” by Philip K. Robins was one of the first comprehensive 
summaries of the NIT experiments and described it as a clear and consistent decrease in labor 
supply. “This paper provides a set of consensus estimates of the labor supply responses to these 
experiments. It is found that despite the wide range of treatments and evaluation methodologies, 
the results are remarkably consistent. On average, husbands reduced labor supply by about the 
equivalent of two weeks of full-time employment. Wives and single female heads reduced labor 
supply by about the equivalent of three weeks of full-time employment. Youth reduced labor 
supply by about the equivalent of four weeks of full-time employment. Estimated income and 
substitution effects are quite similar” (Robins, 1985). It is important to address the kind of labor 
supply reduction that Robins is using in his paper, as it is a source of difference and confusion 
between advocates for and against UBI when citing labor supply. Robins describes two 
possibilities for defining labor supply: annual hours of work and the employment rate. Most of 
his emphasis lies in the former, specifically as he continues to reiterate how average work hours 
across all workers in the experiments were reduced. The theory behind using this as labor supply 
says that if every laborer decreases the amount of hours they work, then overall work decreases, 
which he says represents labor supply.  
The contrary idea of labor supply, which is more formally accepted in modern labor 
economics, describes it as the number of hours people are willing to and able to supply at a given 
wage rate. While similar, the important distinction between the two definitions is the word 
“willing”. Robins’ labor supply strictly evaluates work hours of all laborers with no 
consideration for the unemployed, those who would add hours if given the opportunity. In this 
paper, labor supply will be defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics where data is being 
collected from as Labor Input: “defined as “Tornqvist aggregate of of hours of all persons 
(classified by age, education, and gender) using compensation per hour to determine weights. 
The level of labor input is the Tornqvist quantity index of labor multiplied by the 2012 labor 
compensation” (BLS). This definition is clearly closer to Robins’ definition, and purposefully so. 
This definition will help set up a more direct relationship between labor input and health of 
workers which will be analyzed later in this section. Using this definition also echoes the bias 
that previous studies held, the main one being that the implementation of an unconditional cash 
transfer program decreases labor supply, as supported by theory and empirical evidence from the 
NIT experiments. A decrease in labor supply automatically pushes the capital to labor ratio up, 
which is an extremely important bias to keep in mind moving forward. Now that labor supply 
has been defined, it is important to remember that these results and discussions from previous 
literature are in reference to NIT and not UBI. The two unconditional cash transfer programs can 
certainly be thought of in a similar light, but there is a slight difference that needs to be 
understood in order to correctly assess the bias that exists from analyzing UBI using past NIT 
experiments.  
To begin, it is necessary to define the terms and explain the difference between them. 
NIT is a form of basic income where subjects receive varying amounts of government supplied 
income depending on their income. The lowest earners, say someone who has an income of $0, 
would receive the maximum possible benefit. In the RIME for instance, the maximum possible 
benefit for the Guarantee Level (G) 1.00 was 100% of the income necessary to reach the poverty 
line. As the subject receives more and more income, the amount that they received declined from 
1.00 down to 0.30 as the Tax Rate (t) reached 0.70. This method is clearly structured towards 
bringing everyone up to the poverty line or beyond as is possible. UBI on the other hand gives a 
flat amount of money. There are plenty of versions that vary, but to keep analysis consistent with 
discussion in the current academic and political sphere, this paper will focus on $1000 dollars a 
month for persons 18 years and older. According to the US government, the US poverty 
guideline for the 48 contiguous states for a four-person family is $25,750. This means that if a 
subject family has no other income, then they will be just below the poverty line provided there 
are two adults receiving this income. If the subject is an individual, the poverty line is $12,490, 
and this version of UBI will bring the subject just below the poverty line as well. If an individual 
receiving UBI were to have an income that raised them from $0 a year to $12,490 a year, then 
they would still receive the $12,000 a year constant from UBI. If the same person were receiving 
NIT instead of UBI, this person would no longer receive any unconditional cash transfers once 
their income reached the poverty line of $12,490. From the above descriptions it is observable 
that NIT will adjust depending on the subject’s income situation and the country’s poverty lines. 
While UBI will stay fixed regardless of subject’s income or the country’s poverty line. The only 
change will occur when the policy framing UBI changes. 
In this regard, it is important to note an individual’s decision making in either scenario. 
Say there are three possible income levels for an individual who is employed in the US. Their 
income is either above $0 but below the poverty line, their income is exactly at the poverty line, 
or their income is above the poverty line. If individuals maximize their utility, then a person 
receiving NIT has different incentives depending on which scenario they are in. If they are in the 
lowest income level, and they have no ability to acquire a job that will secure them an income 
higher than the poverty level, then they have no incentive to work. This is because they will be 
pushed up to the poverty line regardless of whether or not they work, so they may as well spend 
their time on leisure rather than work. For an individual whose income is exactly at the poverty 
line, it is likely they will act in the same way. They could not work and receive the same income. 
They have been separated in this example, however, because it is possible that an individual at 
this level could expect their income to rise if they keep working, so they may push to reach the 
next level of income above the poverty line. For individuals above the poverty line, they have no 
incentive to work less. If they work less, they will receive a lower income because the highest 
they can get using NIT is already below their current income. Now comparing to UBI there is no 
difference among the three scenarios. Regardless of an individual’s income, they will receive the 
same amount from UBI. Therefore, their decision making on whether or not to work is less 
affected with UBI than NIT especially at lower levels of income. If an individual is looking to 
maximize their utility, they should still work even after receiving UBI because they would be 
able to directly increase their total income.  
The results from the five experiments then need to be re-analyzed in context of the 
differences between NIT and UBI and how they are framed in this paper. To do this I will 
discuss the theory behind the five experiments and apply it to UBI specifically. In a model 
between wage and hours worked, there is a shift of the supply curve with the introduction of 
NIT, which results in higher wages and, with a low demand elasticity, a slight decrease of hours 
worked. This however does not change the overall labor supply as was discussed before. A 
change from NIT to UBI has no direct reason to change this. Using the above descriptions for 
NIT, as people have less income, they receive more in cash transfers. There is a clear risk in this 
situation where many people would stop working a low paying job if they believe it doesn’t 
change their income situation. However, with UBI, this risk is largely nullified due to the fact 
that there is not a direct reward for quitting the labor force. Regardless of hours worked, a 
person’s government cash transfers will remain constant, therefore it is much more likely that 
people would aim to stay in the labor force to earn as much income as possible. Therefore, the 
concern of less hours worked, and a decreased labor supply is lower in UBI than with NIT, 
where demand was already inelastic enough to make both of the above negligible.  
The other side of the question for this paper comes from the amount of production that 
stems from the input of capital instead of labor. As was stated towards the beginning, capital, in 
the form of technology, has taken the vast majority of jobs that the US has to offer. However, 
there are quite a few approaches to measure capital and many economists have argued about 
which is the proper way for different discussions. For this paper I will define the amount of 
capital as capital services. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics capital services are 
defined as: “Tornqvist aggregates of capital stocks (equipment, structures, intellectual property 
products, inventories, and land) using rental prices to determine weights. The level of capital 
services is the Tornqvist quantity index of capital multiplied by the 2012 capital income.” (BLS).  
The past NIT experiments do not, however, mention this version of capital in their 
papers. In fact, the summary reports and following articles focus in solely on the labor supply 
effects with no mention of non-human capital whatsoever. The exception is the summary report 
for the Iowa and North Carolina Experiment which mentions a similar type of capital called 
capital input. “It is noteworthy that farm hours among controls in both' North Carolina and Iowa 
were declining over time. This control group trend may have been the result of such phenomena 
as the adoption of labor-saving capital inputs, the improvement of off-farm job opportunities 
which alleviated some underemployment on the farm, or changes in natural conditions such as 
weather” (Rural Income Experiment). It is possible that the NIT experiment helped keep the 
labor supply from being replaced by capital as described above such that the control groups 
hours were declining. However, because that was not the focus of these experiments, they did not 
extrapolate on that subject. More recent studies in other countries also shed no light on the effect 
on capital. A major issue and possible explanation as to why they do not is because the 
experiments focus on some groups of low income individuals in an area, and not on the entire 
population. Therefore, it would not be a fair and balanced assessment to look at capital services 
in the area of the experiment because different businesses would realistically have different 
proportions of employees in the treatment or control groups. 
To get around this in my paper, the first idea was to look at other countries that may have 
implemented UBI or NIT throughout the entire country and then examine their country capital 
service levels, but no such country exists. Therefore, for this paper, in order create a relationship, 
I will equate NIT and UBI to other social welfare programs in the US. The programs are Social 
Security Disability Insurance (1956), the Food Stamp Program (1964), Medicaid (1965), 
Supplemental Security Income Program (1972), Earned Income Tax Credit (1975), Low-Income 
Home Energy Assistance (1981), Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (1996), and The 
Affordable Care Act (2014).   
As the conversation surrounding the capital to labor continues to develop in this paper, it 
is important to start referencing how a proposed UBI implementation would affect health and 
healthcare in the US. One of the most important points within economics of healthcare is that it 
is always cheaper and more efficient for the healthcare system for people to partake in 
preventative measures of healthcare rather than last minute measures. These preventative 
measures include less smoking, drinking, body fat, and more exercise (Leigh & Fries). This 
comparison could be demonstrated by the difference between someone who eats healthy and 
exercises vs. someone who becomes obese by eating poorly and never exercising, only to get a 
liposuction later in life to try and get rid of that fat. This choice appears to be such an obvious 
one that many people would scoff at the comparison, however, not eating healthy and not 
exercising is sometimes required by people depending on their economic situation. Take for 
example someone who is below the significantly below the poverty line, working two jobs to try 
and feed and care for their family in a low-income area. Low-income areas typically suffer from 
a problem known as food desserts: an area in which grocery companies don’t find it profitable to 
build stores. The result is a large area, sometimes ten square miles, that has no access to fresh 
and healthy foods. For the type of person described above, they likely have no time in their 
schedule to travel that distance. Even if they have a car, they would have to pay for the extra gas 
to make the trip, when it is realistically far cheaper and efficient for them in their current 
situation to pay for less healthy food that they could find in their area. Not only is low income a 
strong negative factor on preventative physical healthcare, it is also detrimental on mental health.  
James House described the importance of income as it relates to health in his book 
“Beyond Obamacare” (2015). He references a paper from 2000 that shows data that people with 
lower income, especially below 50% of the poverty line, tend to have much higher psychosocial 
risk factors than their counterparts that have higher incomes. These risk factors include high 
hostility, unmarried, never attend meetings, talk with others less than once a week, low self-
efficacy, high depressive symptoms, and two or more recent negative events. A large part of 
healthcare that is underdeveloped is healthcare aimed towards mental health including areas that 
would address the above issues.  
UBI likely would have very little influence on the health and lives for those people far 
above the poverty line. However, it is clear that for those near and below the poverty line, it 
could be a huge increase to their physical and mental health in the long run by giving them the 
tools to work on their preventative healthcare. The basic relationship between health and income 
is clear as well. “These indices of morbidity, both self-reported and measured, are approximately 
linearly related to the logarithm of income, in all except very high and low incomes (this means 
that increasing income is associated with better health, but that there are diminishing returns at 
higher levels of income)” (Ecob & Smith). The five NIT experiments also recorded many 
different quality of life measures that that some studies of that decade did address. These 
measures ranged from healthier birth rates, to more dedication to education, even to healthier 
eating habits. Several studies did confirm that the treatment groups were healthier, divorces 
withstanding. The reason can be logically traced back to the reduction in work hours. remember 
that many of the reduced hours were not from dropping from the labor supply, but rather taking a 
few hours a week off from work. These work hours would presumably be used to substitute in 
healthy consumption or leisure. Both of these are positive influences on long term health 
(Coleman & Iso-Ahola). On top of that, another key fact of healthcare economics is that healthier 
workers produce more in the workplace. (Boles, Pelletier, & Lynch) This makes them more 
valuable in the work force in comparison to capital. However, it also increases their wages since 
they have become more valuable, making them less competitive against capital in the work 
place. This paper seeks to understand how a possible change in health from UBI as described 
above would affect the capital to labor ratio. The health variable that will be used is number of 
sick days taken off by an individual on average every year. This is the most logical variable for 
this paper because if an employer is analyzing whether to invest in labor or capital, one piece of 
the puzzle they will likely look at is how many days their workers are taking off for sick days. 
The more days that are being taken off for sick days, the less productive their workers are being 
relative to capital. Therefore, those would theoretically be substituted for capital.  
III. METHODOLOGY 
 To examine UBI’s effects on the capital to labor ratio, this paper will use a least-squares 
regression using 
𝐾
𝐿
 as the dependent variable. All of the variables for this regression are listed 
below in Table 3. The first variable, Year, is self-explanatory and tells us the data is time-series 
going from 1948 to 2018. The second variable, CapitalServices is defined as follows according 
to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Tornqvist aggregates of capital stocks (equipment, structures, 
intellectual property products, inventories, and land) using rental prices to determine weights. 
The level of capital services is the Tornqvist quantity index of capital multiplied by the 2012 
capital income.” (BLS). The third variable, LaborInput, is defined as follows also according to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Tornqvist aggregate of of hours of all persons (classified by age, 
education, and gender) using compensation per hour to determine weights. The level of labor 
input is the Tornqvist quantity index of labor multiplied by the 2012 labor compensation.” 
(BLS). These definitions for capital and labor allow us to compare the weighted values of capital 
and labor against each other accurately in the ratio. The data for both capital and labor over time 
in the US came from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The fourth variable, CapitaltoLaborRatio, is 
generated by dividing Capital Services by Labor Input. The fifth variable, Grossdomesticproduct, 
is the GDP of the US indexed at 2012 = 100 and came from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis. The sixth variable, sickdays, is the average number of sick days any given individual took 
on a given year. This data comes from the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) which 
collected data on sick days taken from work for the year 1977, 1997-2017. It is important to note 
that this is the first variable that does not have a value for every single year. The seventh 
variable, UBI, is an incremental variable, which increases by one on years that major social 
welfare programs are implemented that affect the working population in the US. These programs 
as stated above are: Social Security Disability Insurance (1956), the Food Stamp Program 
(1964), Medicaid (1965), Supplemental Security Income Program (1972), Earned Income Tax 
Credit (1975), Low-Income Home Energy Assistance (1981), Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (1996), and The Affordable Care Act (2014). The eighth variable, slopedum, is a slope 
dummy variable created by the multiplication of the variables sickdays and UBI. This variable is 
meant to help identify the partial effects of UBI on the capital to labor ratio while holding sick 
days constant. Before moving forward, it is important to note an issue that would arise if nothing 
is adjusted. From 1978-1996 there is no data for average sick days taken by an individual, and 
after that time period, there is only one incremental change in the 𝑈𝐵𝐼 variable in 2014. 
Therefore, there are a lot of problems dealing with partial and perfect multicollinearity between 
the two variables. To help amend this issue, data for sick days between 1977 and 1997 will be 
interpolated linearly. This leads to a lot more independent variation among these two explanatory 
variables and a stronger regression. This is represented by the ninth variable, polatesickdays. The 
tenth variable, polateslopedum, creates another slope dummy variable similar to the first one, but 
this one uses the interpolated sick days data instead of the regular sick days data. Note that the 
two variables with interpolated data have 41 observations as opposed to the 22 observations their 
non-interpolated partners have. The eleventh and last variable, partial, is the partial derivative of 
the main regression taken with respect to UBI. This equation is shown below.  
There are multiple regression possibilities given the above variables and they are ordered 
as follows. The first regression is run simply with GDP, Year, and UBI. This regression is meant 
to give a starting point for UBI and get a sense of it’s initial direction and significance without 
introducing the intercorrelated variable sickdays.  
Regression 1:  
𝐾/𝐿𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑡 
The second regression keeps the original three variables and aims to add in sickdays to 
see its effect on the significance of the other variables, specifically UBI.  
Regression 2: 
𝐾/𝐿𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑡 
The third regression is meant to create coefficients that exist in correspondence with the 
slope dummy variable. This is the type of regression that is going to have its partial derivative 
taken with respect to UBI.  
Regression 3: 
𝐾/𝐿𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑡 
The fourth regression takes a step back from the slope dummy variable as it adds in the 
interpolated data of sickdays into the regression. This regression is meant to be compared with 
the second regression in terms of what variables are now significant and if any signs have 
changed.  
Regression 4: 
𝐾/𝐿𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑡 
The fifth and final regression takes a step forward again and reintroduces the slope 
dummy variable using the interpolated data. This regression again will have its partial taken with 
respect to UBI and it will be compared to the partial realized by the third regression.  
Regression 5: 
𝐾/𝐿𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑡
∗ 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑡 
The structure of the partials for the third and fifth regressions look nearly identical. Their 
only differences to be analyzed, and the purpose of looking at them both, are the coefficients 
brought about by interpolating the sick days data.  
Partial of Regression 3: 
𝜕
𝐾
𝐿 𝑡
𝜕𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑡
= 𝛽3 + 𝛽5𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑡 
Partial of Regression 5: 
𝜕
𝐾
𝐿 𝑡
𝜕𝑈𝐵𝐼𝑡
= 𝛽3 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆𝑡 
Based on the theory and explanations above, 𝑈𝐵𝐼 is expected to take on a negative 
coefficient and 𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 is expected to take on a positive coefficient. That is to say, it is 
expected that the implementation or increase of social welfare programs that have a similar effect 
to UBI to will decrease the capital to labor ratio. It also is expected that an increase in sick days 
taken, and therefore a decrease in healthy workers, will increase the capital to labor ratio. 
However, it is still possible to obtain a negative coefficient on 𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 due to the idea that 
healthier workers could potentially require higher wages, and therefore will be replaced by 
capital despite being more productive.  
It was also stated how UBI should have a positive effect on health, and because of this 
interaction, 𝑈𝐵𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝐼𝐶𝐾𝐷𝐴𝑌𝑆 is in our regression. Looking at the partial derivates of regressions 
3 and 5 it is expected that there will be a positive slope in both cases. A positive slope would 
indicate that there is an interaction between the variables. More than that, the interaction would 
describe an increase in sick days taken, and therefore unhealthy workers, should make the partial 
effect that UBI has on the capital to labor ratio more positive.  
For robustness checks, it is important with these regressions to check for 
multicollinearity. For each regression, this is tested using the VIF command in Stata.  
IV. RESULTS 
The results from the five regressions are listed in Table 3. To begin, look at the 
coefficients for UBI across all of the regressions. In every single one UBI has taken on a 
negative coefficient as expected. However, only three of these coefficients are significant at any 
level. Remember that regressions 3 and 5 are mostly used for the partial effect of sick days on 
UBI, so focus the evaluation of the UBI coefficients to regressions 1, 2, and 4. It is apparent that 
UBI is significant for all three of these regressions at the .05, .01, and .10 levels respectively. 
With the introduction of sick days in the second regression, UBI’s significance went up as its 
coefficient became more negative. Then in the fourth regression, as the sick days data was 
interpolated, its significance went down from 0.01 to 0.10, and its coefficient became less 
negative. For the variables sickdays and polatesickdays, continue to focus on regressions 2 and 4. 
Sickdays was significant at the 0.10 level and polatesickdays was significant at the 0.01 level 
with both variables having negative coefficients, which is more negative for polatesickdays than 
sickdays. This does not support the hypothesis that as sick days increase, the capital to labor ratio 
also increases. This coefficient effectively means that as firms evaluate their workers health and 
productivity via the number of sick days they take, they decide to lay off workers as fewer sick 
days are taken. In other words, they are replacing workers with capital the healthier they are. 
This does support the idea that healthier and more productive workers could warrant higher 
wages. While more productive than if they were taking more days off, they also cost more to the 
company and therefore are being replaced. Across all of the regressions, GDP does very little to 
describe the capital to labor ratio, even when it was significant in regression 1 it had an 
extremely small positive coefficient. The R-Squared values for all of the regressions are very 
high, suggesting that the regression fits the data very well.  
 Next are the results from the partial derivatives of regressions 3 and 5. Look at Figures 2 
and 3 respectively for scatter plots illustrating these relationships. The first thing to notice 
between the two plots is that they have opposite relationships. Figure 2, depicting the 
relationship between sick days and UBI using non-interpolated data shows a negative 
relationship. This would suggest that as the average number of sick days taken by an individual 
increases, the partial effect of UBI on the capital to labor ratio holding sick days constant 
becomes more negative. This means that UBI becomes a more effective tool for decreasing the 
capital to labor ratio as laborers become unhealthier. Figure 5 depicts the exact opposite 
situation. This scatter plot suggests UBI becomes a more effective tool for decreasing the capital 
to labor ratio as laborers become healthier. This issue stems from the fact that the coefficients on 
the slopedum variable and the polateslopedum variable have opposite signs. Then it is necessary 
to evaluate the differences between these two slope dummy variables as they relate to UBI. 
Slopedum has data points for the years 1977, 1997-2018, during which time UBI has a total of 3 
different values, one of which on 1977, and can largely be ignored. Polateslopedum has data 
points for the year 1977-2018, which includes a larger variation of UBI values at 4, with multiple 
instances for each values. Therefore, the partial relating to regression 3 will be ignored and the 
scatter plot depicting the partial relationship using regression 5 will be accepted. This result is 
also far more logical in practice. As workers become healthier, it would make sense that the 
receiving of UBI would decrease the capital to labor ratio more than if they were not healthier in 
the eyes of their employers.  
 Then the question to be answered is what do these results mean in the eyes of existing 
literature and what are its limitations. To begin, this paper is the culmination of many existing 
stigmas and contrary thoughts surrounding the use of UBI and its effects on the working class in 
the US. Furthermore, it dives into a possible involvement of health and healthcare that exists 
between the relationship between UBI and the capital to labor ratio. This means that this paper 
and its results have been wrought by decades of existing literature that connects different parts of 
this puzzle. But on the other side, this is the first paper that attempts to put the capital to labor 
ratio next to UBI, let alone add worker health into the mix. Because of that fact, there are many 
places where this paper can be made better by additional future literature. Strictly contained to 
the data and variables, there are several things that other researchers could do differently.  
 First, the use of sick days as a measure of health could easily be flawed. There are 
countless ways that one could evaluate the health of individuals. A few examples could include 
life expectancy, morbidity, functional living, and an assessment of the healthcare system. The 
use of sick days could be appropriate in order to highlight its place in the workplace and the 
effect that could have on the substitution of capital and labor. But the number of sick days an 
individual takes could be based on any number of factors besides being sick, including a stigma 
in the US against taking sick days at all and how that could change over the years. The amount of 
data available is also small relative to the number of years that the capital to labor ratio has been 
tracked in the US. The interpolation of data obtained from the NHIS could have been 
inappropriate if the data is not truly linear, but it was necessary in order to obtain data that varied 
more often among the incremental variable, UBI.  
  That brings the second possible area for improvement in this paper, the UBI variable. 
Using other social welfare programs in order to create a regression based on the entire US could 
also be flawed. While it does create the closest possible relationship that exists between UBI and 
capital, it is still using country wide data to estimate something that has only ever been done in 
small experiments. UBI as described above, functions similar to a given social welfare program 
that affects the health and spending of those in lower incomes far more than those above the 
poverty line. But that does not make it a perfect substitute for those programs. To be more 
accurate would be to say that the incremental variable is a rough estimator of the existence of 
social welfare programs that affect lower income citizens. Any given researcher could do a much 
different set of welfare programs to represent their incremental variable over the years and 
defend it as strongly as the variables in this paper. Furthermore, the UBI variable could also be 
changed to a pure dummy variable that takes the value of one once a large welfare program is 
implemented in the US, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit.  
 It is also possible to alter the focus of this study by defending the idea that health and 
healthcare does not have much of any relationship to the capital to labor ratio. One could easily 
find a far different topic that relates closer to the UBI and capital to labor ratio relationship. One 
such topic could be related to governmental efficiency on the distribution of such cash transfers, 
and how it being handled from a state or federal level may alter the effectiveness of the transfer. 
 The regressions that were run in this paper were also most certainly not impervious to 
issues. According to the robustness checks, it is apparent that there exists plenty of 
multicollinearity between variables. R-Squared is extremely high for all of the regressions, which 
highlights the probability of an imperfect multicollinearity issue within the regression. From 
Table 4 it is clear that GDP for instance is highly correlated with VIF values reaching over a 
hundred. UBI and sickdays were also not exempt from appearing to be possible multicollinear 
with VIF occasionally exceeding values of 5.  
 The partials of regressions 3 and 5 are also blatantly opposing each other in their results. 
Supporting one of the partials over the other could easily be a defendable stance for any logical 
and accomplished economist. It would be just as easy to defend the third scenario where neither 
partial should be defended due to a couple different facts. The VIF values for both of those 
regressions are extremely high suggesting a lot of partial multicollinearity. This makes perfect 
sense because even the interpolated data for sick days only covers roughly have of the years 
where both UBI and the capital to labor ratio have values. In fact, in the data set, sickdays only 
exists at the same time as UBI for four of the nine values that the incremental variable takes on 
over the course of 71 observations. On top of that, sickdays has no exact reason to perfectly 
follow the linear path between 1978-1996 that the interpolation executes for it. Between the 
years of 1996 and 2018 the values of sickdays seem to change with no discernable pattern 
whatsoever, increasing and decreasing at different random years. And finally, as if there wasn’t 
enough reasons to positively pick one scenario or the other, none of the important variables are 
significant at in regressions 3 or 5. The coefficients that gives the slope of figures 2 and 3 
specifically are the coefficients for slopedum and polateslopedum respectively, and neither are 
significant. Even more so, their 95% confidence intervals have both positive and negative values 
in nearly equal amounts. Yet again, the construction of the UBI, sickdays, and polatesickdays 
variables could easily be changed and defended by any logical and accomplished economist. 
Because of that fact, this would be the largest issue among all of the data and variables. If other 
researchers decide to use this paper as a starting point or a reference point for use on expanding 
the topic of interest, they would need to address these variables first.  
 Most of these major issues stem from the simple idea that this paper could not be written 
on a narrowed down singular experiment or set of experiments within or across different nations. 
As researchers continue the study of this topic, it is important to look at this paper and move 
forward with the idea that there may be a better way to analyze capital on a smaller scale in the 
area of the experiments. Because this paper was not able to do such a thing, there are a lot of 
generalizations that result in far less conviction in the analyzation of the results and what they 
can be extrapolated to describe.  
V. CONCLUSION 
 It is clear that this paper is not perfect and should not be the final declarative study on the 
subject. In fact, this paper should be used as a stepping stone for more research and analysis in 
the same area, while addressing the issues that this paper dealt with. One of the first issues with 
collecting data to address the research question is that data specific to the question does not exist. 
To reiterate, only one of the reports for the NIT experiments in North America mentioned capital 
services at all, and it was more of an interesting trend they noticed rather than an actual area they 
sought to understand. Unfortunately, despite there being a promising amount of logic and theory 
supporting the idea that capital services is tied to the implementation of UBI or an equivalent, 
current experiments outside the US continue to not record capital services in their analysis. 
 This omission of data collection could stem from a couple of places. First of all, it could 
simply be ignorance. As was stated before, this is the first academic paper that defined a research 
topic in such a narrow space and sought to analyze it with available data. The lack of such other 
similar works could in fact be a direct cause of there being a lack of awareness or interest in 
recording capital data in modern experiments. The second reason there might be omission is the 
possible difficulty of obtaining it. As stated above in the third section, these experiments are 
typically aimed towards low income individuals in certain areas. While it is possible that these 
individuals make up a large enough proportion of the area to make a difference in the capital 
services input locally, it is far more likely that it would be a negligible difference, especially in 
the high density areas within which these experiments are often conducted.  
 The omission of data collection of capital services is not the only part of this new area 
that could be improved upon either. The health side of the research question could also be 
expanded upon in current and future experiments on UBI. This is much easier data to collect than 
capital services if the variable remains as sick days from an experimental standpoint. Those 
running the experiment simply collect the data themselves in interviews with those in the 
treatment and control groups. It could be argued that worker health should be defined in a 
separate way, but along with the reason for it being used in this paper, sick days is also far less 
confidential and easier to obtain from test subjects.  
 If data collection in experiments began to include capital services despite the two 
possible issues above, as well as sick days of the test subjects, then the ability to answer this 
research question becomes far easier. The data and regressions could then be brought down to a 
local level and specified for the area that is being treated in the experiment. Even further, if this 
became a constant among several different experiments in different countries, then the effects 
could be measure in regressions over time and across different areas. This would be a very strong 
addition to the current literature surrounding the topic. Also, in this way, the variables would no 
longer have to be reasoned out to try and use in a regression such as UBI and sick days were. 
Another possible solution to the data problems that this paper struggles with is the 
implementation of UBI on a country wide level in any country in the world. Even a similar 
unconditional cash transfer program would suffice to recreate this paper with far fewer 
weaknesses in its arguments. At that point, the only variable that would have to be sought after is 
sickdays, which is occasionally a comically easy variable to find with countries like the UK for 
example. Without the adjustments from a data collection standpoint, this topic will remain 
difficult to empirically analyze. If that is the case, then future research should do its best to use 
this paper as a home base to explore from in the usage of new variables and different data 
sources for existing variables.   
As it stands, this paper acting alone can provide a very specific set of policy 
recommendations for those who would hope to reference it in the implementation of UBI. If 
whoever is implementing UBI desires to use it to decrease the capital to labor ratio, they could 
potentially succeed according to the theory and coefficients on UBI in regressions 1, 2, and 4 that 
support that idea. However, it must not be understated that the health aspect of this paper goes 
the opposite direction from what was hypothesized. This means that the healthier workers that 
the US would be supplied with would increase the capital to labor ratio, and according to the 
regression, would increase it more than UBI or an equivalent would decrease it. The partial of 
regression 5 does defend the idea that UBI would be more effective given healthier workers, but 
that does not necessarily translate to it outweighing the effect that sickdays is having on its own. 
As Table 2 shows, the coefficients on the sickdays may be outweighed by UBI in regression 2, 
but the interpolated sickday coefficients outweigh the UBI coefficients in regression 4. 
Therefore, this paper cautions those policymakers using this paper or the ideas this paper 
proposes as reasons to implement UBI to decrease the capital to labor ratio. This paper 
emphasizes that they may not get the effect they are hoping for if their sole purpose is to 
decrease the capital to labor ratio.  
If policy makers are looking to address the issue of the capital to labor ratio, then it is 
likely that one of the many other proposed federal or state welfare programs could do a better job 
than UBI. For example, at the time this paper is being written, the US political sphere is debating 
on something called the Job Guarantee. Such a program would place the federal (or possibly 
state) government in a position to become the last resort for jobs to the general public. Suffice to 
say, this would directly tackle the issue on automation replacing jobs by having the government 
supply jobs straight to those who require them. Of course, this proposal is not perfect either, but 
it just goes to show that there are clearly options for addressing the capital to labor ratio that do 
not involve UBI. Furthermore, based on the results from this paper, UBI, sickdays, and their 
interaction does not result in a clear effect to the capital to labor ratio. While specific values may 
be significant, different variables are significant in directions that support opposing results.  
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Figure 1: Capital to Labor Ratio over time 
Figure 2: Partial of Regression 3 
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Table 1: Summary of NIT experiments from basicincome.org  
Name Location(s) Data collection Sample size: 
Initial (final) 
Sample 
Characteristics G* t** 
The New 
Jersey 
Graduated 
Work 
Incentive 
Experiment 
(NJ) 
New Jersey & 
Pennsylvania 1968-1972 1,216 (983) 
Black, white, and 
Latino, 2-parent 
families in urban 
areas with a male 
head aged 18-58 
and income 
below 150% of 
the poverty line. 
0.5 
0.7
5 
1.0
0 
1.2
5 
0.3 
0.5 
0.7 
The Rural 
Income-
Maintenanc
e 
Experiment 
(RIME) 
Iowa & North 
Carolina 1970-1972 809 (729) 
Both 2-parent 
families and 
female-headed 
households in 
rural areas with 
income below 
150% of poverty 
line. 
0.5 
0.7
5 
1.0
0 
0.3 
0.5 
0.7 
The 
Seattle/Den
ver Income-
Maintenanc
e 
Experiment
s 
(SIME/DIM
E) 
Seattle & 
Denver 
1970-1976, 
(some to 1980) 4,800 
Black, white, and 
Latino families 
with at least one 
dependent and 
incomes below 
$11,00 for single 
parents, $13,000 
for two parent 
families. 
0.7
5, 
1.2
6, 
1.4
8 
0.5 
0.7, 
0.7-
.025
y, 
08-
.025
y 
The Gary, 
Indiana 
Experiment 
(Gary) Gary, Indiana 1971-1974 1,799 (967) 
Black households, 
primarily female-
headed, head 18-
58, income below 
240% of poverty 
line. 
0.7
5 
1.0 
0.4 
0.6 
The 
Manitoba 
Basic 
Annual 
Income 
Experiment 
(Mincome) 
Winnipeg and 
Dauphin, 
Manitoba 1975-1978 1,300 
Families with, 
head younger 
than 58 and 
income below 
$13,000 for a 
family of four. 
C$3,
800 
C$4,
800 
C$5,
800 
0.35 
0.5 
0.75 
 
Table 2: Variables 
 
Table 3: Regressions 
 
Table 4: VIF values, Test on Multicollinearity 
Variable Regression 
1 
Regression 
2 
Regression 
3 
Regression 
4 
Regression 
5 
Year 175.21 69.87 80.47 105.32 203.47 
GDP 77.47 65.46 65.59 98.45 185.26 
UBI 30.28 4.84 493.06 6.91 164.50 
Sickdays - 1.29 712.23 - - 
Slopedum - - 1332.94 - - 
Polatesickdays - - - 1.37 161.45 
Polateslopedum - - - - 442.23 
Mean VIF 94.32 35.37 536.86 53.01 231.38 
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